18 January 1944 – Securing the
Bridgehead
X (BR) Corps:
201 Guards Brigade
40 Royal Tank Regiment
46 Infantry Division
56 Infantry Division
In total, about 50,000 men.
Frank de Planta, battlefield expert
‘By first light 2 Northants, less “B” Company, who were running the ferries, were on the
far bank and up with 2 Royal Scots Fusiliers and 6 Seaforths. However, the minefield in
front of 17 Infantry Brigade proved a very extensive obstacle and many 6 Seaforths had
to be retrieved and evacuated which further eroded the Brigade momentum. In addition,
any attempt to bring up stores and vehicles was immediately subject to fire from German
artillery and pockets of infantry on the flat lands. This further slowed momentum.’
As day broke on 18 Jan 44, the bridgehead was subjected to heavy German artillery
fire from Observation Posts in the hills to the North. 17 Infantry Brigade were in the
most exposed position, pinned down by minefields and artillery fire on the flat ground
around Monte d’Argento, and so a smokescreen had to be put down to shield the
position from view. Whilst they were across the River Garigliano, the whole of 17
Infantry Brigade had suffered so many casualties that they were hard pressed to hold
onto the triangle of ground that they had secured around Monte d’Argento.
By first light 2 Wiltshires reached the Minturno-Castelforte road and pushed
on into the foothills heading for Tufo. Throughout 18 Jan 44 the Germans mounted
counterattacks against both 13 Infantry Brigade and 17 Infantry Brigade using some
tanks, but all were repulsed largely using defensive artillery.
What caused delay to further sustained progress was the inability to establish
permanent crossings of the River Garigliano that were out of range of German guns
and observation from German artillery Observation Posts on Monte Scauri.
158 Field Ambulance War Diary
A Medical Station was set up with two Field Surgical Units and one Field Transfusion
Unit, and both ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies were employed for the evacuation of casualties
during the initial stage of the crossing of the River Garigliano. ‘A’ Company provided
two Sections which landed by DUKW and one Section which crossed the river in
assault boats, whereas ‘B’ Company established a Light Advanced Dressing Station
800 yards South of the river with a pool of trucks working forward to the river.
It was originally intended that the two Sections in DUKWs should land North of
the river, clear the casualties, and form a Casualty Embarkation Point and return the
casualties on returning DUKWs and Landing Craft. Unfortunately, the DUKWs carrying
these Sections ran aground on a sandbank in the mouth of the river and all personnel and
equipment had to be taken off by assault boats. After a few days the Advanced Dressing
Station moved across the river and was established in the area South of Minturno.
15 Infantry Brigade War Diary
18 Jan 44
GOC 5 Infantry Division Major-General Philip Gregson Ellis, now decided that he could
do no more until the original objectives of 17 Infantry Brigade around Minturno and
Tremensuoli had been secured. This he could only achieve by using the Reserve Brigade.
Accordingly, he planned that 15 Infantry Brigade should cross the river that night at 2200,
pass through 2 Wiltshire's positions and advance Westwards in the early hours of 19 Jan 44.
The Minturno Sector Dec 43 – Mar 44 showing the three main objectives of 5 Infantry Division:
Minturno, Tremensuoli and Monte Natale. (TNA)
At first light on 18 Jan 44 a Staff Officer from 5 Infantry Division arrived to say
the battle had not gone quite according to plan the previous night and that 15 Infantry
Brigade instead of being held back to pass through 17 Infantry Brigade and directed up
the Ausonia valley, would now be at one hour’s-notice to move up behind 13 Infantry
Brigade, prepared to pass through them probably 18 -19 January and attack Minturno
from the East, thus relieving the pressure on 17 Infantry Brigade who were still pinned
down in a small triangular parcel of land just beyond the river.
15 Infantry Brigade Command went straight to HQ, 5 Infantry Division, to get back 1
York and Lancs., who had been placed under command 17 Infantry Brigade for the first phase
with a view to passing through to secure Monte Bracchi. 1 York & Lancs. had not crossed
the river and were accordingly ordered back to their original area, Pizzone, having marched
about 20 miles and been on their feet all night. They arrived at Pizzone at about 1500.
15 Infantry Brigade Command spoke to the three Commanding Officers of their
Battalions on the telephone from Division about 1300 and ordered all three Battalions
to move forward in troop carrying vehicles to the debussing area immediately after
dark. 15 Infantry Brigade HQ to move, if possible, before Battalions moved. These
moves were carried out without incident.
15 Infantry Brigade now consisted of:
1 Green Howards
1 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
1 York & Lancs.
The new orders from HQ 5 Infantry Division were:
1 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry to clear Tufo by 1000 hours 19 Jan 44.
1 Green Howards to advance at 1000 hours on 19 Jan 44 under heavy barrage
directed on Minturno and Point 141. 1 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry to advance
under same barrage and secure Point 201. Start line to be through West end of Tufo.
1 York & Lancs. to remain in Brigade area of road and track junction as reserve.
From 2200 18 Jan 44 the Battalions were to cross river by ferry; order of march,
1 KOYLI, 1 Green Howards, 1 York & Lancs. Tactical Brigade HQ would also cross
during the night.
Brigade HQ would remain at present location and be mainly responsible for calling
forward unit transport as soon as bridge was open.
All three Battalions crossed the river without incident and reached their concentration
areas, guides being provided by 13 Infantry Brigade. 1 KOYLI were unlucky enough
to encounter ‘S’ mines [Schrapnel mines – when triggered, these mines are launched
into the air and then detonated at about 1 metre from the ground] and suffered some
20 casualties, all from one Company. No vehicles were able to cross the river during the
night owing to bridging difficulties.
15 Infantry Brigade consisted primarily of Yorkshire men, for all three Regiments
were based in Yorkshire. This gave them a County identity as well as a Regimental
identity.
5 Infantry Division Revised Plan of Attack showing 15 Infantry Brigade moving ahead
to take Tufo and Minturno. 13 Infantry Brigade are to the right of them. No area was
safe from mines. 10 Corps War Diary. (TNA)
1 KOYLI War Diary
18 Jan 44
It was difficult and unpleasant. Mines were a very real danger and a single-line track
had been marked across country with tapes by the Royal Engineers. This may well have
been good enough for men in daylight, but for heavily laden men in the dark it was a
nightmare, despite the new moon.
Owing to the slow progress, the sappers [Royal Engineers] were prevented from
bridging by daylight and the move of 201 Guards Brigade was postponed for 24 hours.
56 Infantry Division crossed opposite Castelforte, but 46 Infantry Division failed to get
a bridgehead across the River Garigliano.
2 Cameronians War Diary
The CO. went forward to
2 Inniskillings crossing place and found that all their assault
boats had been either sunk or holed and that only part of the leading Company had
managed to get across the river. Their crossing place had been subject to heavy
mortaring and small arms fire. 2 Wiltshires crossing had been successful, and it was
agreed between the two COs. that 2 Inniskillings would cross at 2 Wiltshires crossing
place, which they did. The CO. was ordered to send only two Companies across the
river following 2 Inniskillings.
Lieutenant D.H. Deane, 2 Scots Guards writes
18 Jan 44 Tuesday
‘Early reveille, move off in trucks with our hearts in our mouths. Along dreary
roads passing very ominous blood wagons coming back the other way. Turn off to debussing area, and wait – wait interminably it seems, no one knows what for. At last,
move off and march for an equally long period – troops absolutely whacked, cross
the River Garigliano in sinister silence. A very pretty American girl lashing up coffee
to the ambulance drivers. I wonder if we look heroic filing away into the darkness.
More marching in all about ten miles and arrive in a field with damn all shelter from
the cold.
Frank de Planta, battlefield expert:
18 Jan 44 – 0100
‘2' Wiltshires crossed one and a half hours late. The remainder of 2 Inniskillings followed
immediately and then 2 Cameronians crossed, still in the boats of 2 Wiltshires.’
2 Wiltshires War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0115
Leading Companies start their advance.
18 Jan 44 – 0130
Advance is halted at the first objective. This is due to the failure of 2 Inniskillings
crossing and the situation of 17 Brigade on our left.
Sir David Cole, 2 Inniskillings, Rough Road To Rome.
18 Jan 44 – 0200
‘Initially the Wiltshires were still using many of their boats so that only three were
available for us. Now the whole of “B” Company were over the river and had set off
across the plain, now strangely silent, towards the forming-up place for the final assault.
“C” Company and Advanced HQ crossed next.’
Royal Inniskillings Regimental Museum
‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies were reassembling. As Lt. Col. J.P. O’Brien-Twohig said, ‘If
you are lost, make for the sound of firing’. The attacking Companies: ‘B’ and ‘C’,
pushed on towards their objectives protected by creeping artillery fire.
The heavy artillery was on the western slopes of the mountains leading down to the
Garigliano plain.
Spike Milligan, ‘D’ Battery 56 Heavy Regiment Royal Artillery, Mussolini: His
Part in My Downfall 18 Jan 44 – 0220
‘Awakened by someone screaming, coming from the guns, pulled back the
blackout and could see the glare of a large fire, at the same time a voice in pain
was shouting “Command Post, for God’s sake somebody, where is the Command
Post?” It was someone with his hair on fire, coming up the path. He was beating
it out with his hands. I jumped from my bed, sans trousers and ran towards him,
it was Bombardier Begent. I helped beat the flames out. His face and hands were
badly burnt. I helped him up the ladder to the Command Post and I blurted out
to those within: “There’s been a direct hit on the guns.” I realised then that I was
late with the news, wounded gunners were already being attended to. Everybody
looked very tense. Behind me flames were leaping twenty feet in the air. I rushed
back to my dug out and dressed in a flash. Took my blankets back to the Command
Post to help cover the wounded. I then joined the rest of the Battery, who were
all pulling red-hot and burning charge cases away from those not yet affected.
They were too hot to pull by hand, so we used pickaxes wedged in the handles.
Lieutenant Stewart Pride was heaping earth on them with his hands. Gunner
Devine seemed to be enjoying it. He was grinning and shouting. “This is the first
time I’ve been warm today”. It never occurred to me that some of the boxes that
were hot might still contain unexploded cordite charges. Fortunately, they didn’t
go off and that’s why I’m able to write this diary today.
It was a terrible night. Four Gunners die and six were wounded. All suffered burns
in varying degrees. The work of subduing the fire went on until early dawn. It was
terrible to see the burnt corpses. There was little Gunner Musclewhite, he’d been killed
sitting up in bed. He was burnt black, and his teeth showed white through his black
f
leshless head. Sgt Jock Wilson too, Gunner White and Ferrier.
17 Infantry Brigade War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0245
Brigade Command orders 6 Seaforths to patrol Highway 7 and 2 Royal Scots Fusiliers
to secure left flank by capture of Monte Argente. 2 Northants to attack Minturno in
daylight.
6 Seaforths War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0300
All approaches and tracks towards the railway were impossible owing to extensive
mine field.
17 Infantry Brigade War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0330
17 Infantry Brigade to consolidate in present position and 15 Infantry Brigade to take
Minturno Ridge by passing through 17 Infantry Brigade.
6 Seaforths Citation: Bar to Military Cross for Major A.E. Low
Major A.E. Low‘s Company was the leading Company in the assault crossing of the
River Garigliano on the night of 17–18 Jan 44. When moving forward to the riverbank,
two of his subalterns and three of his Platoon Sergeants were seriously wounded by ‘S’
mines. He himself was also wounded, but he carried on and led his Company across
the river under heavy shell fire and machine gun fire. His calm courage and forceful
leadership under most difficult circumstances were a magnificent example to his men
and assured the subsequent success of the whole assault crossing by the Battalion. In
spite of being in great pain from the wound which had affected his sight, Major Low led
his Company, now much depleted by casualties, forward from the river and continued
to engage the enemy until the success of the operation. Throughout the night and until
about mid-day on 18 Jan 44, when he was ordered to hand over his Command and have
his wounds attended to, this officer displayed magnificent courage and devotion to duty.
6 Seaforths Citation: Bar to Military Cross for Captain G.A. Falconer
When the assault crossing of the River Garigliano began on the night 17-18 Jan 44, Capt.
Falconer was Second in Command of ‘C’ Company. His Company Commander was
severely wounded, and Capt. Falconer took command and got his Company across the
river under intense enemy shell fire. By first light 18 Jan 44 his Company had secured
its first objective, and the first enemy counterattack which took place soon after dawn
was successfully repulsed. Shortly afterwards the enemy brought up three tanks and
counterattacked again. In this engagement Capt. Falconer was himself wounded and
his Company suffered many casualties. He continued in action however and conducted
a successful withdrawal to more advantageous positions covering the bridgehead. As
a result of his fine leadership the enemy counterattack was successfully held. Capt.
Falconer’s courageous leadership was a magnificent example to his men and the success
of the assault crossing was in no small measure due to this officer’s skill and courage.
Sir David Cole, 2 Inniskillings, Rough Road To Rome.
18 Jan 44 – 0400
‘Most of us were now across the river and wireless messages told us that “B” Company,
having ejected such German opposition as it had encountered along the way, had
reached its ordained position in front of the Minturno Ridge ready for the final assault.
“C” Company then started to move forward from the river.’
Advanced HQ paused for a moment near the edge of the last orchard. Men ahead of
us were falling, struck by flying shrapnel. Then in a single second everything became instantly silent and dark. I was floating gently in the air. I landed in slow motion, feeling
nothing. I had heard no sound and seen no flash. My eyes seemed loath to open. In the
blackness my first dazed sense was one of disaster. Sprawled on the ground, I slowly
passed a hand over my body. On my haversack and map case I encountered lumps
of what seemed like suet pudding. Below my knees my battledress was soaked with
blood. God, I’ve lost a leg, I thought. I felt on and found my boots. I moved my legs. I
breathed. Acrid fumes entered my throat. Any sounds I could hear seemed to be miles
away. My eyes opened. All this in seconds.
In the dim light I found myself cast like refuse amongst a heap of mangled bodies.
In the eddying smoke of the exploded shell, I saw men reeling away, nursing wounded
arms or legs. In the middle was a pile of shattered corpses. Besides me that heroic and
happy warrior, to whom I had just been talking, lay in pieces. Part of somebody’s brains
was attached to my haversack. Half of another indistinguishable body lay at my feet,
oozing intestines. Its blood had been squirted over my legs. On my left side was a boot
with a foot in it and some other miscellaneous objects. I felt no nausea. I felt nothing
at all. I was in a state of deep shock. Any momentum that I immediately thereafter
developed must have been instinctive or pre-programmed, – the product of training so
often repeated that it could influence me even in my sleep.’
Royal Inniskillings Regimental Museum
‘Then, suddenly the whole nerve centre of the Battalion was practically wiped out when
a shell landed in the middle of Battalion HQ. O’Brien-Twohig himself was wounded.
Strenuous efforts by the wireless Officer, Captain David Cole, quickly restored order
and communications.’
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Cross for Captain David Lee Cole
17–18 Jan 44
On the night 17-18 Jan 44, 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers carried out a crossing of the
River Garigliano and an attack on the high ground, 8196, (Eastern edge of Minturno
Tufo ridge). Enemy Direct Fire killed the Battalion HQ ‘18 Set’ signallers while in the
assembly area. Capt. Cole with great coolness and bravery moved about organising
fresh signallers, under fire. On the other side of the river the HQ ‘18 Set’ signaller
was injured by a shell which also knocked down and severely shook Capt. Cole. He
managed to get the ‘Set’ working again and communication with the forward companies
being absolutely vital, Capt. Cole personally led a line forward to make a connection.
One of his party was wounded crossing an enemy mine field, but in spite of this and
continuous shell fire, Capt. Cole succeeded in getting a line to the forward companies.
This line was of immense value in arranging the Direct Fire.
Throughout the night and next day, Capt. Cole displayed complete disregard for his
personal safety and his constant work on communications had the most direct result on
the success of the attack.
13 Infantry Brigade War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0430
Owing to the delay in crossing by the Battalions the Divisional Command allowed zero
hour for Phase III to be postponed to 0430 hours.
2 Wiltshires War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0430
Barrage starts and the Battalion begins to advance. During the advance two of our guns
shoot short and fall amongst our Companies, but casualties are slight.
2 Royal Scots Fusiliers Citation: Military Cross for Major A.F. Whitehead
Major Whitehead‘s Company landed on the beach on 17 Jan 44 about 600 yards South
of Mount d’Argento which was found to be firmly held by enemy mortars and machine
guns strongly dug in, inside caves. Major Whitehead speedily organised two attacks
on this feature, the first immediately on landing, and the second after having arranged
covering fire from
Vickers Machine Guns which landed later. A third attack with artillery
support was launched at 0445 on 18 Jan 44. In the three attacks the open beach was
the only possible line of advance. Major Whitehead exhibited the greatest courage and
leadership throughout the three attacks which he led personally and pressed home with
the utmost determination in the face of enemy fire and the presence of ‘S’ mines. His
energy and fine personal example were an inspiration to all ranks. The attacks by his
Company were undoubtably instrumental in preventing the fire of the enemy on Monte
d’Argento being brought to bear on the rest of the Battalion landing further South.
17 Infantry Brigade War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0455
Enemy still hold Monte Argente and 2 Royal Scots Fusiliers call for artillery against
them.
6 Seaforths War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0500
‘C’ Company reach main road and dig in 100 yards from road.
18 Jan 44 – 0530
Owing to congestion at beach head and enemy shelling of area, 12 Platoon, ‘B’ Company
were unable to cross river. Three Sections of ‘A’ Company under Lt. Phillips contact
Major A.J. Low MC with two Sections and proceed to main road. An enemy Scout Car
appeared and halted by this party. On fire being opened up the Scout Car made off.
Sir David Cole, 2 Inniskillings, Rough Road To Rome.
18 Jan 44 – 0530
“B” Company crossed the River Ausente then ran into a deep minefield near the
railway line. The need for them to advance fast across open ground in the brightening
twilight had limited the usefulness of mine-detectors and within a few minutes the
Company had lost 17 men, all dreadfully wounded, on mines. Further progress straight
into the minefield would have been suicidal so they had to find a way round.
“C” Company cleared the mines and cut their way through the barbed wire along
the riverbank of the River Ausente. They swept on across the railway line where the
forward German machine-gun crews, dazed by the bombardment and the steadiness
of the soldiers advancing towards them, climbed out of their trenches and ran. A few
minutes later the leading Platoons of “C” Company were dashing across the Lateral road at the foot of the ridge and into the tangle of barbed wire beyond. In the full light
of day, they could now see how steeply the ground rose up to the German defences.
2 Inniskillings arrive at the forming up place ready for the assault just in time to
catch their own barrage. Determined to keep close to the barrage as it crept forward,
with bayonets fixed, they walked steadily forward out of the trees on to the last stretch
of open grassland at the foot of the Minturno Ridge. “B” Company came out of the
gully in which it had been waiting to join the attack.
2 Cameronians War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0530
‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies had crossed the river. The remainder of the Battalion was to
remain in the assembly area during daylight and cross at night.
The CO. was ordered by the Brigade Commander to cross with the remainder of
the Battalion as the crossing in the left sector by 17 Infantry Brigade had not gone
according to plan and to send two Companies to the assistance of 2 Wiltshires.
6 Seaforths War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0540
Major Low and party are shelled by enemy and withdraw to a position 200 yards from
road, leaving Lt. Phillips and six men to watch the road armed with one
P.I.A.T. An
enemy tank approached and halted 20 yards from the position and opened fire. The
P.I.A.T. was fired but the bomb failed to explode, although having made a direct hit on
the tank. The party was then ordered to withdraw through a vineyard where contact was
finally made with Battalion HQ.
2 Cameronians War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0545
The CO. ordered ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies to move towards the Lateral road at 815958 to
come under the command of 2 Wiltshires. By this time ‘D’ Company started crossing
the river. It had now become light but fortunately there was a ground haze restricting
enemy observation.
52 Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0600
206 Battery: Section of 17 pounders from Landing Craft Tanks landed South of
river in error. Landing lights were placed on wrong side of river which resulted in
complete disorganisation of landing party. Lieutenant Allen and Troop Sergeant landed
successfully near Monte d’Argento.
Major G. H. Peile Adventures of “392 Battery”, 98th Field Regiment 1945 IWM
"The “A” Troop boating part proved something of a flop. Led by their Troop Commander in his new Sherman they made a dashing assault-landing only to find that the only opposition came from “B” Troop, since their Landing Craft Tank had landed on the south side of the river instead of the north."
17 Infantry Brigade War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0600
DUKWS party reported stranded on sand bar at river mouth.
2 Cameronians War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0630
‘D’ Company crossed the river and took over ‘A’ Company’s position. Battalion HQ
then crossed followed by ‘C’ Company and moved forward.
Sgt. Raymond Hawtree, A Company 164 Field Ambulance, Private Papers.
18 Jan 44 – 0600
‘Dawn was about to break, and we had travelled about a mile and a half across the fields
heading towards a railway track, according to our map.
We came across Captain Essex dealing with his 2 Wiltshires men at his Regional
Aid Post and doing a fine job with his treatments. He had found a small house to treat
his wounded, under cover, which was a good thing in my estimation. Here we were
extremely exposed, as it was getting lighter every minute. Evacuation was out of the
question here. Normally, according to all training, we would at this stage be evacuating
our wounded to the Main Dressing Station, operated by our Headquarters Company.
But in this instance we could not go back to cross the river as we had no transport
whatsoever to carry out the job. All we could do was to treat the wounded the best we
could with the materials available and carry them forward to some suitable place to
be picked up at a later stage. This was indeed a hazardous operation for us, now fully
exposed to the enemy, in the light of day.’
2 Wiltshires War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0700
Forward Companies start to meet opposition and two P.O.W.s are taken.
Sir David Cole, 2 Inniskillings, Rough Road To Rome.
18 Jan 44 – 0730
“B” Company now firmly established on their objective. They occupied the German
trenches to face their front, rear and, not least, left flank, where the Germans held the
ridge which went to the strongly held towns of Tufo and Minturno, still uncaptured by
the British.’
6 Seaforths War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0730
‘C’ Company report counter attacked by three tanks and infantry with machine guns.
Attack was driven off and casualties sustained on both sides.
92 Field Regiment Royal Artillery War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0735
Left Observation Post reports Tufo practically obscured by smoke from Direct Fire
Plan, not from generators.
18 Jan 44 – 0740
Smoke clears. 2 Cameronians have been ordered to take Minturno owing to delay by
17 Infantry Brigade. Fire Plan will probably be required in support of 2 Cameronians
and 2 Inniskillings. Batteries warned barrage may have to be shot again and instructed
to keep 200 rounds per gun dumped.
18 Jan 44 – 0750
365 Battery reports heavy anti-aircraft or medium rounds falling short on 2 Wiltshires
and causing casualties. HQ Royal Artillery informed.
HMS Orion Naval Record
18 Jan 44
Repeated bombardment from Gulf of Gaeta by HM Cruiser Spartan and HM Destroyers
Faulknor, Jervis, Janus and Laforey.
18 Jan 44
Bombarded Terracina in support of 5th Army advance across Garigliano River. Enemy
shore gunfire was ineffective.
18 Jan 44
Under air attacks and fire from enemy shore batteries.
5 Division, 17 Brigade
No.2 Army Film and Photo
Section Cameraman Sgt Hopkinson
Copyright: Imperial War Museum
(Video IWM 643/ 5-7)
Meanwhile the Navy lends a
hand. Lying off shore destroyers give
support fire to the Brigade, orders being transmitted by a Brigade Artillery
officer to sailors at Brigade HQ, who
retransmit the orders to the ships by wireless.
The Brigade Artillery Officer,
Captain H. W. Hill of Scotland calls out “fire” orders from his wireless truck
to the sailors crouched beside it over their wireless sets, with which they
transmit his orders to the destroyers off shore. Finally another Officer is seen pointing out
targets to a sailor holding the firing-map.
13 Infantry Brigade War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0750
By about first light the two forward Battalions were estimated on their objectives. 2 Inniskillings had Battalion HQ and one Company on the contour. 2 Wiltshires had Companies on Point 102, Point 201 and in Tufo. Heavy casualties had been suffered by both Battalions from enemy small arms fire, mines, mortars, and artillery fire. The enemy positions had been overrun but there were sections of infantry and snipers still in the area.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Medal for Sergeant Robert Boak
17–18 Jan 44
Sgt. Boak, as Pioneer Sgt. with 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, was ordered to move with
a fighting patrol ahead of the Battalion to give warning of mine fields and, if possible,
to clear paths for the Battalion.
Owing to the break-down of the original crossing this party reached the start line
well ahead of the Battalion. Sgt Boak reconnoitred a route forward across the River
Ausente a tributary of the River Garigliano, and, with the greatest personal bravery,
remained in the riverbed during the opening of our barrage, which fell on the river, so
as to clear forward the road, ahead of the attacking troops.
It was due to the outstanding courage and devotion to duty of this NCO that the
right attacking Company got through the enemy mine fields without a single casualty.
The left company suffered a number of casualties in the mine fields and Sgt. Boak at once
moved to their assistance and was of the greatest help to the Company Commander in
getting his Company through the mines. Sgt. Boak’s sang froid had a most tonic effect
on the Company, and but for him it would undoubtably have lost time and dropped
behind the barrage.
The Garigliano. Position at 8am on 18 Jan 44 showing routes taken by 2 Inniskillings,
2 Wiltshires and 2 Cameronians. (Map John Strafford) 5 Infantry Division History
18 Jan 44 – 0800
Supported by the Division Artillery, 2 Wiltshire’s reached the Lateral road from
Castelforte to Minturno by first light and crossed it into the foothills soon afterwards.
92 Field Regiment Royal Artillery War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0810
365 Battery Observation Post reports slight opposition around Tufo. Battalion now
dealing with this.
18 Jan 44 – 0830
Message from Brigadier, 13 Infantry Brigade, to Commanding Officer 2 Wiltshires
passed to 365 Battery for onward transmission : 1) watch left flank. 2) two Companies
2 Cameronians on way now, to come under Command, Commanding Officer
2 Wiltshire’s on arrival, and protect left flank.
2 Cameronians War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0830
The Battalion was now across the River Garigliano without suffering any casualties.
‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies, when moving across the open ground to join 2 Wiltshires
experienced considerable trouble from enemy sniper and machine gun fire and several
casualties were incurred.
2 Wiltshires War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0830
‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies reach East end of Tufo, and ‘B’ Company push on through the
village and penetrate half-way into the enemy positions on Point 201, 795972. Hand to
hand fighting takes place. Enemy are too strong for ‘B’ Company who withdraw to East
end of Tufo and form a defensive locality with ‘D’ Company. During this fighting Major
Clark, OC. ‘B’ Company had the first of two miraculous escapes from the enemy. Going
forward to find one of his Platoons he ran into some enemy and took cover in a house
where he was surrounded. He fought his way out with his pistol. ‘S’ Company capture
Point 102, 805955. ‘A’ Company relieved from bridgehead come up into Battalion reserve.
6 Seaforths War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0830
‘C’ Company again counter attacked by three or four tanks and infantry. Left flank was
forced back. ‘C’ Company counter attacked and drove off the enemy.
The right flank was then attacked, and Company then withdrew to line of canal
where defensive positions were taken up, 603928. The enemy then withdrew, and no
further attacks were made.
Frank de Planta, battlefield expert
18 Jan 44 – 0850
‘As the situation of 17 Infantry Brigade front was deemed unlikely to improve in time
for the original plan to be carried out, the General Officer Commanding 5 Infantry
Division decided at about 0850 to bring 15 Infantry Brigade across the river behind
13 Infantry Brigade and pass it through them to clear the remainder of the Minturno
Tufo ridge. 17 Infantry Brigade was told that no further advance was required of it, but
that Monte d’Argento, which was strongly held by enemy machine-gun posts must be
captured.
6 Seaforths War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0900
Stretcher bearer parties were sent out to collect dead and wounded including many of
‘D’ Company, though up to this time no information had been received regarding their
whereabouts.
5 Infantry Division
18 Jan 44 – 0930
A conference at Division HQ was attended by Commander 15 Infantry Brigade and
Commander 201 Guards Brigade. Decided: Monte d’Argento must be taken. Monte d’Argento [just South of Minturno] was now known to be held by at least six machine
gun posts firing from caves in the rock.
17 Infantry Brigade HQ War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0930
6 Seaforths report two tanks seen on main road and are being counter attacked by enemy
infantry. Urgent orders to Main HQ to send forward ammunition and 6 pounders. 206
Anti-tank Battery to deploy two 17 pounders on South bank of river.
164 Field Ambulance War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0930
Message from Brigade stating that 8 casualties were awaiting evacuation. Major Ross
went across river with four men and brought 12 cases back in assault boats.
92 Field Regiment Royal Artillery War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0950
365 Battery Commander instructed to warn 2 Wiltshires of suspected enemy
counterattack forming up West of Tufo at request of 13 Infantry Brigade.
Royal Inniskillings Regimental Museum
With great verve, inspired by Sergeant Robert Boak, the leading platoons of ‘C’
Company, advancing closely behind the barrage, drove the Germans out of their
trenches. ‘B’ Company ran into a deep minefield and suffered heavy casualties. Led by
Major Percy Blake ‘C’ Company pushed on, capturing prisoners and German dugouts.
Within 15 minutes a breach had been made in the main defences of the Gustav Line.
‘B’ Company found a way round the mine field and established its objective. By 10am
the two Companies had occupied the German trenches on 800 yards of the Gustav Line.
They were the first Regiment to breach the Line.7 Infantry Brigade HQ War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1000
6 Seaforths report counterattack beaten off but forced to give ground slightly.
17 Infantry Brigade HQ War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1000
6 Seaforths report counterattack beaten off but forced to give ground slightly.
156 Field Regiment Royal Artillery War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1005
Officer Commanding P Battery called for fire on enemy tanks which were counter
attacking 6 Seaforths. Two tanks destroyed.
52 Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1015
207 Battery: Information received that four German Mark IV tanks had counterattacked
6 Seaforths in area Minturno Ridge which would have been covered by a section of
17 pounders from 206 Battery had our Landing Craft Tanks landed in the right place.
17 Infantry Brigade HQ War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1015
2 Royal Scots Fusiliers Carrier ferried across river with ammunition. Ferry sunk
after discharging Carrier. Ammunition divided between 2 Royal Scots Fusiliers and
6 Seaforths.
18 Jan 44 – 1030
Monte Argente reported still held by enemy. Approx 6 machine guns in caves.
5 Infantry Division History
18 Jan – 1100
The Divisional Commander realising that 17 Infantry Brigade could go no further in
the circumstances and that Minturno would have to be attacked from the right, ordered
2 Cameronians, who had two companies in reserve to close up more to the left towards
Minturno in support of the hard pressed 2 Wiltshires fighting for Tufo. Much had now
to be done to retrieve the position. On the left in 17 Infantry Brigade area, a smoke
screen was quickly generated. 2 Wiltshires in the centre made special watch of their
open left flank and everything possible was done on both sides of the river to meet the
inevitable counterattack. The first one appeared at about 1100 hours after it had been
observed to be coming up to the West of Tufo about an hour previously. It was not a
well-coordinated attack and was easily broken up by the Battalion and the Divisional
Artillery. Meanwhile sporadic incidents occurred all over the front. The Gunners soon
claimed direct hits on some tanks that tried to infiltrate around 2 Wiltshires. 2 Wiltshires,
during that attack, received two enemy ambulances which reported to their Regimental
Aid Post in error and were detained.
164 Field Ambulance War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1100
Ambulance Dressing Station X and A Sections evacuated to house 300 yards West of
original site owing to enemy fire and lack of accommodation. Two captured enemy
ambulances put into use. Both Dressing stations under continuous shell and mortar fire
throughout the day.
Sections X and A under command of Capt. Mill-Irving received 71 casualties on
18 Jan 44.
Sgt. Raymond Hawtree, A Company 164 Field Ambulance, Private Papers
18 Jan 44 – 1100
‘Our Section kept moving forward with the wounded until we came across a low brick
wall. We took cover behind the wall, and I saw that we were alongside the railway lines.
The white tape was still visible, over the wall and across the Railway tracks, a road
alongside and into the woods the other side.
I told the men to remain still and under cover of the wall and went ahead to
investigate. I heard transport coming from my left side and looked ahead to see, what
appeared to be ambulances coming along. However, to my dismay they belonged to the
German Army Medical Corps. There were two of them and the first one in front came to
a halt by the white tape. The German Medical Officer got out of the Ambulance, walked
to the white tape, and then looked at his map, looking all confused. I approached him at
the same time, telling my men to be ready for any eventuality unforeseen.
At this moment I decided to take responsibility for my next action. I said to the
Officer that he was now my prisoner, along with his men and relieved him of his Luger
revolver [sic] and his maps. I told the others to fall in with their Officer. The driver of
the second Ambulance, at that moment tried to turn his Ambulance around and go back.
He received a shock, for as he was turning he went too far from the ditch and hit a mine,
which blew the front near side completely away. No injuries from this incident.
We examined the Ambulance cars, as the men joined by this time to assist, by
backing up my action. There were no wounded in the Ambulances but full of useful
equipment. Capt. Mill-Irving then came forward as I shouted to anyone in the woods
to come forward to take the prisoners from us. Sgt. Blackman in charge of the R.A.P.
saw our plight and came from out of the woods with a Thompson Machine Gun. I did
laugh at him for the nozzle was covered in mud. He took the prisoners away to Brigade
Headquarters, followed by Capt. Mill-Irving.
Being now on the road we checked our map reference again and worked out that the
Quarry, our rendezvous, was a few miles along to the right to where we were standing.
Bearing in mind that we had dealt with the enemy Medical bods perhaps, nevertheless,
we felt we had to be cautious along this road to the Quarry. We found it all right and
formed a Medical Post, keeping busy with the wounded, coming in at a steady pace
from the R.A.P. of 2 Wiltshires.
The captured German Officer and his six men, together with Maps, Luger and other
useful paraphernalia were handed in at Brigade Headquarters, proved most useful to
our cause on this operation. Interrogation of the prisoners also proved helpful to us in
the future advancement of our troops.’
Driving German captured Ambulance along river road, previously marched
by us, heading for the Main dressing Station. This we found and I was greeted most
enthusiastically by Officers and Other Ranks, all ready to deal with the expected wounded.
I gave my report to the Commanding Officer, name escapes me, and he ordered that
the Ambulance be filled with equipment as requested by me. Then Halpin and I went
back to the Quarry with the Ambulance loaded, and quickly filled up the Ambulance
again with more wounded for the second journey to the Main Dressing Station.
We did this journey until the 160 casualties we had dealt with had been evacuated
by Jack Halpin and me, under extreme war conditions; shot and shell etc.
Having cleared the casualties, I then took up my usual position with my Section
at the Advanced Dressing Station, still to deal with the wounded, British and enemy
coming into us.’
Frank de Planta, battlefield expert
18 Jan 44 – noon
‘2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers launched Phase 2 at 0530 and after sustaining enormous
casualties had, by noon, gained an 800 yards foothold in the bridgehead.
2 Cameronians War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1430
2 Wiltshire had not yet taken their objective of Tufo and Point 201, 798966. ‘A’ and ‘B’
Companies in reserve until they were ordered to attack Point 201 from the East end of
Tufo. 2 Wiltshires had entered Tufo but were still meeting heavy resistance at the West end. Major Mitchell (‘B’ Company) assumed control of the attack under the direction of
2 Wiltshire’s Second in Command. The attack was started with ‘A’ Company to the left
and ‘B’ Company to the right. By moving down into the valley between the East end of
Tufo and Point 201 ‘A’ Company was subject to heavy machine gun fire coming from
the West and North-West. The ground was open and consisted of small terraces down to
the valley. ‘A’ Company suffered many casualties including the Company Commander,
Major Wishart and the Second in Command Captain Long. Major Wishart died the
following day from his wounds.
2 Wiltshires ordered the two Companies back and to take up a position on the ridge
at 805962 [Eastern edge of Tufo]. While ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies were digging their
positions the enemy heavily mortared them and many casualties were suffered. Up to this
point ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies had approximately 60 casualties. As their position appeared
unsuitable, ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies were ordered back to 806958 [200m South-East of
Tufo], by the Officer in charge 2 Wiltshires and there they spent the night 18-19 Jan 44.
2 Wiltshires War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1500
During the evening two Companies of 2 Cameronians, were placed under the command
of the Battalion and attacked Point 201 but failed to take the feature. ‘B’ and ‘D’
Companies were counterattacked twice during the night. Both attacks were beaten off
mainly by good fire direction of Artillery Observation Post with ‘B’ and ‘D’ companies.
18 Jan 44 – 1630
Three Enemy tanks and infantry come along road from Minturno just below Tufo and
attack Battalion HQ on rear slopes Point 102. Attack beaten off. One tank hit by PIAT
and turret damaged.
Sgt. Raymond Hawtree, A Company 164 Field Ambulance, Private Papers
18 Jan 44 – 1630
‘Three small German tanks were seen approaching the A.D.S. and, having been
accumulating arms from the wounded, we did not wish to be caught with them, so they
were quickly stowed under the staircase out of sight.
We heard a loud bang outside and actually saw the turret of the first tank literally
disappeared from its housing. The two tanks following decided to beat a retreat, turn
and disappeared. The lad that fired the PIAT gun at the tank came into the medical room,
with a huge bruise on his shoulder, having fired the gun. He was later congratulated by
one of his Officers, when he came in also for treatment.’
17 Infantry Brigade HQ War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1630
Monte Argente shelled by Navy. Position has been twice attacked by 2 Royal Scots
Fusiliers.; is heavily mined and booby trapped.
18 Jan 44 – 1700
Brigade Commander orders no further landing or ferrying until beach area is clear of
mines.
Phone message to Main HQ that GOC insists on capture of Monte Argente. Naval
support offered. Later considered unsafe and plan arranged for 2 Royal Scots Fusiliers
night attack.
T. B. Davis The Surrey & Sussex Yeomanry (98 Field Regiment) 1980
18 Jan 44
“Monte Argento was supported by a fire- plan from the Regiment. Not until midday was the little hill finally taken. The Royal Scots Fusiliers had suffered nearly two hundred casualties in a total advance of two miles and the Seaforth Highlanders had lost two hundred and forty. To the right of 17 Brigade the picture was less gloomy, for 13 Brigade had gained all its objectives, and Major Peile and Capt. Stride were across the river with 6 Northants. The Minturno Ridge was still in enemy hands but the Royal Pioneer Corps were maintaining a constant smokescreen along the line of the river and under cover of this were swiftly constructing a tank ferry.”
164 Field Ambulance War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1700
Major Ross seriously wounded near ferry by a mortar bomb.
2 Wiltshires War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1800
‘C’ Company ordered back to Point 102.
D. Woolard, attached to 2 Wiltshires, My Day,
18 January
‘We moved up into Tufo and then we were sent out into Companies, two detachments
to each Company if they needed any mortar support. Jobber Brown’s detachment and
ours, Gibb Mullins were sent to “D” Company at the top of Hill 102. After breakfast we
drew rations on our way up to the new positions and as soon as we got there, we started
to dig our two gun-pits and set the mortars in. We prepared the bombs ready to range
when ordered. Our Observation Post was in a house close to the gun-pits, it had been
hit many times by shells and had to be entered through a shell-hole on the opposite side
to the enemy positions. When inside you went up to an attic which had a small window
from which you could see quite an area of enemy held territory. As this house was under
constant observation by the enemy, it was dangerous to use binoculars during daylight
if it was sunny, or to move about too much.
Apart from a few enemy shells and mortar bombs at intervals, the Germans
intensified shelling towards sunset. Our detachment dug deep slit trenches behind
two straw stacks so that any shrapnel from exploding shells would be slowed down or
stopped from falling into our trenches. The other detachment dug their slit trenches in
a bank and covered them with old doors, wood, and branches. In the afternoon we did
some ranging with smoke bombs but were not called on to do any real task. Again, we
gathered some straw to put in our slit trenches to keep us a little warmer at night. We
slept in full equipment ready to stand to the mortars during the night if ordered to do
so. We even kept our steel helmets on as several shells fell quite close that night and
shrapnel fell extremely near to our slit trenches. When it was my turn to go on guard, I
could see the flash and glow of exploding shells and mortar bombs.’
Sir David Cole, 2 Inniskillings, Rough Road To Rome.
18 Jan 44
‘The evening of 18 January was cold and grey, with a sparse wintry mist hanging low
above the ground and a few stars twinkling feebly in a darkening sky. “B” Company were
savagely attacked from three sides. First they knew of it was when in the gathering darkness
they heard the Germans, obviously in large numbers, shouting and cat calling from amongst
the scrub and trees below. The Germans, visible only from time to time as black shapes
flitting between the trees, were not only swarming up the ridge in front; they were streaming
across the exposed left flank where the ridge ran along to Tufo and soon afterwards they
were also heard shouting and trampling about on the slope behind “B” Company.
To begin with, our men not only held on, but in many places climbed out of their
trenches and counter charged the Germans with Brens and Tommy-guns. For example,
Sergeant Anderson, having seized a German Spandau, charged the enemy with it, and
killed many of them at close quarters. As he said laconically afterwards: “I had the
Spandau and I had the ammunition, and the Germans were there.” But our losses were
also heavy and soon Section Commanders could be heard shouting one after another,
that their ammunition was running low. About the same time another Spandau opened
fire from the Company’s right flank, a menacing portent that the Germans would soon
complete their encirclement.
Eventually it became clear that the much-reduced Company was being further
and seriously depleted, was all but surrounded by a much larger force and had almost
exhausted its ammunition. It was decided, therefore that rather than be completely
overrun they would try to withdraw the remnants of the Company to continue the
fight elsewhere. Orders were given for a general withdrawal towards “C” Company.
They withdrew across the rear side of the ridge through the narrow gap still unblocked
by the Germans. When “B” Company finally assembled the battered survivors of the
Company totalled about 35. Within twenty-four hours over sixty men had been lost and
the Company had been reduced to little more than a Platoon.
With the Germans thus re-established just along the ridge, “C” Company was now
obviously on the chopping-block next. The Company was then re-organised using
the remnants of “B” Company to guard the now highly vulnerable left flank. Vickers
machine gunners from 7 Cheshires were placed astride the track leading to the area just
recaptured by the Germans.
Royal Inniskillings Regimental Museum
‘B’ Company found itself under attack from three sides by overwhelming numbers. As
ammunition began to run out and hand to hand fighting developed, the decision was
taken to withdraw. Only the bravery of men like Sergeant Thomas Vincent Anderson,
Corporal Stephen Hughes, and Fusilier John Stranex enabled the Company to withdraw
to ‘C’ Company’s position.
Expecting further counterattacks, Major Percy Blake [‘C’ Company], organised
his Company and the remnants of ‘B’ Company. When the attack came, elements of
practically the whole Battalion fought a ferocious battle to keep the Germans at bay.
Eventually sustained British artillery fire halted the attack.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Medal for Sergeant Thomas
Vincent Anderson
18 Jan 44
‘B’ Company, 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers was in position on its objective 809964
[East end of Minturno-Tufo ridge]. The Company Sergeant Major had been wounded
and Sgt. Anderson was acting as CSM. The Germans counter attacked the Company
and a party got into the position. Sgt. Anderson, who had armed himself with a German
machine gun, rushed the German party firing his machine gun from the hip. He killed
several of the Germans and the remainder were thrown into confusion and dealt with.
The ammunition situation in the Company became acute towards evening and ‘B’
Company was forced by another attack to fall back on ‘C’ Company’s position about 814964 [500m downhill, East of the end of the ridge]. Sgt. Anderson remained behind
covering the withdrawal with his German machine gun, and it was due to his outstanding
personal bravery and coolness that the majority of ‘B’ Company was withdrawn in good
order. In re-organising ‘B’ Company in its new position Sgt. Anderson’s behaviour in
moving about under close range enemy fire put fresh heart into his Company after a
difficult time and brought their morale back to the highest level.
There is little doubt that but for the initiative and cool calculating bravery of this
NCO a great part of his Company would have been killed or captured.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Medal for Corporal Stephen
Hughes
18 Jan 44
Corporal Hughes was in command of a Section attached to ‘B’ Company, 2 Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers, in position on the Minturno-Tufo ridge when a heavy German
counterattack developed against ‘B’ Company, its main thrust being against the Platoon
with which Cpl. Hughes Section was part of. With great determination Cpl. Hughes
held the fire of his Section until the enemy were only 25yards away. The effect of this
was to kill a number of Germans and to defeat that attack.
When the remainder of his Platoon ran out of ammunition Cpl. Hughes continued
to hold the enemy off until he was the only one left with ammunition. The enemy had
by now infiltrated round both flanks of his Section. Cpl. Hughes with great personal
courage moved forward alone and attacked the enemy on the right flank allowing his
Section to withdraw. Cpl. Hughes himself, worked through the enemy and by engaging
them with his Thomson sub machine gun from their rear, held up their attack and caused
them confusion.
His personal bravery throughout the action was a fine example to all in his vicinity.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Medal for Fusilier John Stranex
18 Jan 44
Fusilier Stranex was Platoon runner of 10 Platoon, ‘B’ Company, 2 Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers which was in position about 809964 [East end of Minturno-Tufo ridge].
The Germans delivered a number of determined counterattacks in one of which
they over ran a Section Post. The Platoon Commander was with another Section
and Fusilier Stranex at once led the other two Fusiliers in the Platoon HQ forward,
drove the enemy back from the Post, they had captured with the bayonet and
successfully held it.
But for the personal bravery and quick wits of Fusilier Stranex there is no doubt the
Germans would have succeeded in taking the remainder of the Platoon from the rear.
17 Infantry Brigade HQ War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1900
First Carrier (2 Royal Scots Fusiliers) to leave beach blown up on mine 20 yards along
track. No casualties, but all ammunition destroyed.
18 Jan 44 – 2010
5 Seaforths report Company in Amphitheatre out of touch. Uneasy situation.
2 Royal Scots Fusiliers War Diary
18 Jan 44
Seven Carriers eventually got across river by ferry but two of these were destroyed by
mines.
Weather mainly very good with warm sunshine and good visibility, apart from early
morning mist caused mainly by smoke screen on river.
2 Cameronians War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 2100
The first transport across the river arrived at Battalion HQ consisting of two carriers.
1 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 2230
The Battalion crossed the river entirely on a marching basis. Everything had to be
carried as so far, no vehicles had crossed the river. The Battalion crossed the river, 22
Officers and 450 other ranks in strength.
The march from the river Northwards to the Assembly area behind 13 Infantry
Brigade was difficult and unpleasant, mines were a very real danger and a single
line track had been marked across country with tapes by the Royal Engineers. This
may well have been good enough for single men in daylight – but for heavily laden
men in the dark – it was a nightmare despite the new moon. It was like marching
across a mined Romney Marsh, deep dykes and ditches every few hundred yards.
If the front halted as it often did, the whole long single file column across the plain
halted as well. What a target it was if the enemy had availed themselves of it.
Luckily, they did not.
X (BR) Corps History
Enemy Counterattacks
On 18 Jan 44 the Germans, who from information given by some of the prisoners
taken in the assault, had evidently been taken by surprise and had no strong force for
a counterattack. They were nevertheless able to mount two immediate counterattacks
from the resources of 94 Infantry Division, supported by tanks, and by attacking the
exposed left flank of the bridgehead were able to regain some lost ground.
The counterattacks of 18 Jan 44 were the first of a long series. Although the enemy
was caught with no reserves immediately available, he contrived to resist stubbornly
and put in repeated local counterattacks. Forced at first to rely on its own resources 94
Infantry Division fought a costly delaying action, in which sappers and rear echelon
troops were used as infantry. In the following four days while X (BR) Corps brought its
reserve brigades across the River Garigliano and strove to enlarge the bridgehead, the
enemy hurried from every part of the front to build up for a counter offensive.
The X (BR) Corps Commander’s intentions at the end of 18 Jan 44 were for 5
Infantry Division to launch 15 Infantry Brigade through 13 Infantry Brigade’s positions
to clear the rest of the Minturno ridge.
The enemy flung into a hasty counterattack on the night 18/19 Jan 44 was mauled
by our defensive fire. Heavy though his losses were, the enemy achieved his object of
holding our advances in check while he massed large reserves for a counter-offensive.
The situation on the front of 5 Infantry Division improved during the night 18/19
Jan 44 when 17 Infantry Brigade succeeded in taking Monte d’Argento. Build up and
maintenance continued to be a problem, however, as the river had not been bridged and
the Class 5 ferry had been sunk during the afternoon of the 18 Jan 44 by a direct hit.
7 Cheshires Citation: Military Cross for Lieutenant P.C. Harris
Lieut. Harris was in command of a machine gun Platoon and landed on the beach
at Monte d’Argento at about 2145, 17 Jan 44. Shortly after landing, his Company
Commander was wounded, and Lieut. Harris took over the Company. Under heavy
enemy fire he took his Sections up to within 150 yards of the enemy, along a completely
exposed beach, and neutralised the enemy machine gun posts at short range. At first light
on 18 Jan 44 Lieut. Harris moved his Platoons to fresh positions so as to avoid heavy
casualties during the daylight. On the evening of 18 Jan 44 he again moved his Platoons
up to within close range of the enemy in order to support an attack. Throughout the
whole period the beach was under heavy enemy fire. Throughout this operation Lieut.
Harris showed outstanding qualities of courage and leadership.
5 Infantry Division History
In the late afternoon 2 Cameronians made an unsuccessful bid to take over Point 201
but received very heavy mortaring which spread along the whole front and heralded
a further and probably more organised counterattack. This series of counterattacks
lasted for almost an hour and a half, from 1800 to 1930, and was finally beaten off
when the enemy had nearly overrun Observation Posts and forward positions. Most
credit must go, as it had already done, and will continue to, to the solid steel wall
of defensive Artillery fire that was invariably put round our positions when they
were being counterattacked. No infantryman in the Division need feel ashamed or
would be unprepared to acknowledge that the gunners probably held the small River
Garigliano bridgehead when called to do so at frequent intervals. So frequent were
these demands for this that the Divisional Artillery fired practically unceasingly for
many days.
An enemy wireless message was intercepted at that time from 274 Infantry
Regiment of 94 Infantry Division who reported to their Division: ‘Enemy in Tufo and
we are being shelled intensively. Request objective counterattack.’ This message was
timed for 1700 and throws increasing light on the highly centralised control exercised
by the Germans.
Again, our Gunner communication was used by Brigadier Campbell to instruct 2
Wiltshires to hold on at all costs and if pushed off the ridge to get back on again. 2
Wiltshires spent most of the afternoon of 18 Jan 44 in hand-to-hand fighting in the
village of Tufo. Two reserve companies of 2 Cameronians went through them to try and
hold Point 201 but were driven back by heavy and accurate mortar fire.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Cross for Major Percy Joseph
Blake
17–18 Jan 44
2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers made an assault crossing of the River Garigliano and
attacked the high ground in 8196 [East end of Minturno-Tufo ridge].
Major Blake was in command of ‘C’ Company, the right attacking Company. Owing
to enemy fire, boats on the Inniskilling crossing were destroyed and ‘C’ Company were
put over lower down the river. It was 0430 before Major Blake was in a position to leave
the riverbank with two Platoons for the start line 3000 yards away, arriving at 0530. The
drive and leadership of this officer in the subsequent advance and attack were beyond
praise. His Company took their objective and were almost at once counterattacked.
Major Blake’s coolness and courage were again outstanding, and he personally led
his small reserve in hand-to-hand action and destroyed German parties who had got a
foothold in his area.
When ‘B’ Company, owing to lack of small arms ammunition were forced to fall
back on ‘C’ Company’s position, Major Blake organised the active defence of his
position so well that further attacks pressed home against it failed, and when he was
wounded in repulsing the final attack early on 19 Jan 44 the position was secure.
During 18 Jan 44 and the night 18-19 Jan 44 the Inniskillings were the most
advanced British troops and but for Major Blake’s great personal bravery and soldierly
qualities in holding on, the position of much more than the Inniskillings would have
been endangered.
A group of
German prisoners
awaiting
interrogation,
18 Jan 44. (Photo
Capt. R.F. Gade,
2 AFPU, IWM
TR 1526German views of 18 Jan 44
18 Jan 44
Private Wilhelm Prinz, 274 Grenadier Regiment
‘On the night of 18 Jan 44, the artillery bombardment began again, so we had to go
into our bunker, on the steep slope behind our house, as it was unreachable by enemy
grenades, in a blind spot to the enemy.
Lt. Wolfgang Gieseler, III Battalion, 274 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘The long-awaited major attack of the enemy with its far superior forces is now here.
Incoming reports state that our resistance groups, which are spread far apart and are
also cowering in bunkers bravely hold out and survive the strong fire to some extent. When the dawn comes the artillery-fire swells up again to a hurricane to creep in
weakened form into the hinterland. We now know that the enemy is about to attack for
the machine guns have taken over in the meantime. In front of us on the heights near
Minturno [Point 201], a bitter close combat fight is already raging, where the Command
Post of the III Battalion lies. This time it is still decided in favour of the defenders; but
the brave Battalion Commander falls among many others.
Major Haarbrucker, who would have already relinquished his Battalion and was
about to return to Germany takes over the orphaned III Battalion, where he falls into
English captivity the very next morning, badly wounded, in fierce close combat at the
heights of Minturno. The remnants of the Battalion must vacate their positions and
retreat to the height of our Regiment Command Post. The enemy has succeeded in a
deep penetration.
Even the field replacement Battalion that was brought in for relief on the second
night can no longer change the situation. The losses to officers and men are extremely
high.’
Private Wilhelm Prinz, 274 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘In great haste we had brought the mail bags into the house, when a small Peugeot truck
drove up. The very excited driver called on us to help unload and explained that he
had loaded dead comrades who had fallen at Garigliano in the morning and were to be
buried in our Regimental Cemetery, which had just been set up, just outside Minturno.
That was quite a shock for me, after the quiet weeks in the military hospital, but it got
even worse: full of consternation I recognized the first dead body I lifted with Karl
Weiser was our doctor, Dr. Fries. The artillery fire that had just started again left no time
for pity and so we quickly ended our macabre work. The trucks had to be taken out of
the danger zone.’
Lt. Wolfgang Wiedemann, II Battalion, 267 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘In Formia. We listened to the strong, undulating shell fire. It had started very early.
Officially there was little information. In the afternoon there was a lot of fighting and
heavy losses. Captain Krege, Commanding Officer of III Battalion, 274 Grenadier
Regiment was killed in close combat at Minturno. Large parts of 274 Grenadier
Regiment were already destroyed.
The German leadership recognized how the main points of attack were now:
Minturno and Castelforte. Now it was a matter of using the last ounce of strength to
prevent a breakthrough that would have meant the end of the Cassino Front.’
Katriel Ben Arie, The Battle of Monte Cassino 1944
18 Jan 44
‘Field Marshal Kesselring immediately recognized the danger and
once again proved his ability to fight land wars, especially in defence.
He immediately gave the order to throw II Battalion 267 Grenadier
Regiment from the coast (II Battalion secured the coastal section from Gaeta to Scauri) to the front line and to deploy all personnel including
drivers of 94 Infantry Division.
However, these measures were not sufficient. The Commanding General of XIV Panzer
Corps. General Fridolin Von Senger und Etterlin, contacted Kesselring directly and
urgently requested the deployment of Reserves from Army Group C, namely 29 and 90
Panzer Grenadier Divisions. General Vietinghoff supported his request, since neither
the Corps nor the Army had any further reserves’.
Mathew Parker, Monte Cassino
‘Von Senger was the man Field Marshall Albert Kesselring charged with the task of
preventing the Allies getting past Cassino. An enigmatic figure far removed from
the popular conception of a Nazi General, he had been a Rhodes Scholar to St.
John’s College, Oxford, in 1912 and remained an Anglophile thereafter. Intellectual,
sophisticated, and anti-Nazi, he was also a devout Roman Catholic and as a young man
had become a lay Benedictine and visited many Benedictine monasteries in Germany.’
Lt. Wolfgang Wiedemann, II Battalion, 267 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘In Formia. Lieutenant Gieseler told me, as Lieutenant Colonel Reich had done all day
long, how he had cheered up his company in Minturno and Tufo with a rifle in his hand
and personally led several counterattacks with only a few remaining men. His example
and his bravery ensured that the fighting spirit of the surviving Grenadiers remained
who was part of the crew of their shelter. Only a few hours ago, a shell killed him when
the shelter was destroyed as he repaired a shot-up telephone line."
Private Wilhelm Prinz, 274 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘Lieutenant Gieseler and I immediately made friends. We were on the same wavelength.
Gieseler was by profession a forester in East Prussia. Lieutenant Colonel Reich was
also from East Prussia. We only had a few minutes to exchange some personal points
of view. His hand was bandaged. Only a few hours ago, when he and his Commander
cheered up the Companies, he was injured by shrapnel. It was a slight wound, and
admission to a military hospital was out of the question. Gieseler did not let down his
Regiment and especially his Commander. I respected this brave and decent officer. One
could feel his honest patriotism burning in his heart. Gieseler became a civilian after
the Polish campaign in 1939. It was not until the end of 1942 that he became a soldier
again.
Lt. Wolfgang Wiedemann, II Battalion, 267 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘In Formia. Finally, I received the order from the Regiment Commander to deploy 2
Company. About 2 km South-East we had to close a big gap in the front Northwest of
Tufo. We had to link up the left and the right. We knew nothing about our left flank. The
right flank was supposed to be at the Cemetery at the back of Minturno, on the Santa
Maria Infante-Minturno road but it could be occupied by “Tommy”. Lieutenant Colonel Reich had the iron will to hold the positions of his Regiment at
all costs. This pale, sleepless man bid me farewell with the usual “soldier’s luck”. He
winked at me with an encouraging wink. A short handshake ended the receipt of orders.
And already I stood in front of the dugout and listened where the next grenades would
land. It was the second day of the great battle. The outlook was bad for me. Black night,
completely unknown, quite mountainous terrain. Nobody really knew where the enemy
were. There was enormous artillery fire from the sea and from the land front. I thought
of my Company, which was waiting for me in trenches and tunnels somewhere nearby.
Now I had to know what to do next.
Characteristic for this 2nd day of action was the seemingly endless artillery fire, the
general disorientation, the nature of the wounded and the chaotic conditions during the
transport of the wounded. Food and ammunition carriers went for miles through heavy
artillery fire. Often, these poor people were left dead or wounded with their loads on
the steep mountain slopes."
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