18 January 1944 – Securing the Bridgehead
In total, about 50,000 men.
Frank de Planta, battlefield expert
‘By first light 2 Northants, less “B” Company, who were running the ferries, were on the far bank and up with 2 Royal Scots Fusiliers and 6 Seaforths. However, the minefield in front of 17 Infantry Brigade proved a very extensive obstacle and many 6 Seaforths had to be retrieved and evacuated which further eroded the Brigade momentum. In addition, any attempt to bring up stores and vehicles was immediately subject to fire from German artillery and pockets of infantry on the flat lands. This further slowed momentum.’
As day broke on 18 Jan 44, the bridgehead was subjected to heavy German artillery fire from Observation Posts in the hills to the North. 17 Infantry Brigade were in the most exposed position, pinned down by minefields and artillery fire on the flat ground around Monte d’Argento, and so a smokescreen had to be put down to shield the position from view. Whilst they were across the River Garigliano, the whole of 17 Infantry Brigade had suffered so many casualties that they were hard pressed to hold onto the triangle of ground that they had secured around Monte d’Argento.
By first light 2 Wiltshires reached the Minturno-Castelforte road and pushed on into the foothills heading for Tufo. Throughout 18 Jan 44 the Germans mounted counterattacks against both 13 Infantry Brigade and 17 Infantry Brigade using some tanks, but all were repulsed largely using defensive artillery.
What caused delay to further sustained progress was the inability to establish permanent crossings of the River Garigliano that were out of range of German guns and observation from German artillery Observation Posts on Monte Scauri.
158 Field Ambulance War Diary
A Medical Station was set up with two Field Surgical Units and one Field Transfusion Unit, and both ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies were employed for the evacuation of casualties during the initial stage of the crossing of the River Garigliano. ‘A’ Company provided two Sections which landed by DUKW and one Section which crossed the river in assault boats, whereas ‘B’ Company established a Light Advanced Dressing Station 800 yards South of the river with a pool of trucks working forward to the river.
It was originally intended that the two Sections in DUKWs should land North of the river, clear the casualties, and form a Casualty Embarkation Point and return the casualties on returning DUKWs and Landing Craft. Unfortunately, the DUKWs carrying these Sections ran aground on a sandbank in the mouth of the river and all personnel and equipment had to be taken off by assault boats. After a few days the Advanced Dressing Station moved across the river and was established in the area South of Minturno.
15 Infantry Brigade War Diary
18 Jan 44
GOC 5 Infantry Division Major-General Philip Gregson Ellis, now decided that he could do no more until the original objectives of 17 Infantry Brigade around Minturno and Tremensuoli had been secured. This he could only achieve by using the Reserve Brigade. Accordingly, he planned that 15 Infantry Brigade should cross the river that night at 2200, pass through 2 Wiltshire's positions and advance Westwards in the early hours of 19 Jan 44.
The Minturno Sector Dec 43 – Mar 44 showing the three main objectives of 5 Infantry Division: Minturno, Tremensuoli and Monte Natale. (TNA)
At first light on 18 Jan 44 a Staff Officer from 5 Infantry Division arrived to say the battle had not gone quite according to plan the previous night and that 15 Infantry Brigade instead of being held back to pass through 17 Infantry Brigade and directed up the Ausonia valley, would now be at one hour’s-notice to move up behind 13 Infantry Brigade, prepared to pass through them probably 18 -19 January and attack Minturno from the East, thus relieving the pressure on 17 Infantry Brigade who were still pinned down in a small triangular parcel of land just beyond the river.
15 Infantry Brigade Command went straight to HQ, 5 Infantry Division, to get back 1 York and Lancs., who had been placed under command 17 Infantry Brigade for the first phase with a view to passing through to secure Monte Bracchi. 1 York & Lancs. had not crossed the river and were accordingly ordered back to their original area, Pizzone, having marched about 20 miles and been on their feet all night. They arrived at Pizzone at about 1500.
15 Infantry Brigade Command spoke to the three Commanding Officers of their Battalions on the telephone from Division about 1300 and ordered all three Battalions to move forward in troop carrying vehicles to the debussing area immediately after dark. 15 Infantry Brigade HQ to move, if possible, before Battalions moved. These moves were carried out without incident.
15 Infantry Brigade now consisted of:
1 Green Howards
1 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
1 York & Lancs.
The new orders from HQ 5 Infantry Division were:
1 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry to clear Tufo by 1000 hours 19 Jan 44.
1 Green Howards to advance at 1000 hours on 19 Jan 44 under heavy barrage directed on Minturno and Point 141. 1 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry to advance under same barrage and secure Point 201. Start line to be through West end of Tufo.
1 York & Lancs. to remain in Brigade area of road and track junction as reserve.
From 2200 18 Jan 44 the Battalions were to cross river by ferry; order of march, 1 KOYLI, 1 Green Howards, 1 York & Lancs. Tactical Brigade HQ would also cross during the night.
Brigade HQ would remain at present location and be mainly responsible for calling forward unit transport as soon as bridge was open.
All three Battalions crossed the river without incident and reached their concentration areas, guides being provided by 13 Infantry Brigade. 1 KOYLI were unlucky enough to encounter ‘S’ mines [Schrapnel mines – when triggered, these mines are launched into the air and then detonated at about 1 metre from the ground] and suffered some 20 casualties, all from one Company. No vehicles were able to cross the river during the night owing to bridging difficulties.
15 Infantry Brigade consisted primarily of Yorkshire men, for all three Regiments were based in Yorkshire. This gave them a County identity as well as a Regimental identity.
From Norway to Burma by Roger Holgate
18 Jan
44
On the morning of 18 Jan
44 the assault Brigades had formed up and were attacking everywhere, enlarging
the bridgehead. Casualties had been
heavy, and it was realised that such a rate of attrition could not be sustained
for too long.
On the night of 18 Jan 44, the three Battalions of 15
Brigade were sent in. Brigadier Martin
led the crossing of 1 KOYLI, 1 Green Howards and 1 York & Lancs., on a
motley of boats and rafts, as the enemy observation posts directed artillery
fire onto them. Three rafts were
destroyed. The engineers had been
unable to construct a bridge because of that same fire, and although they
managed to throw a boat bridge across the river by 2am, the first vehicle to
cross struck a mine, and the wreckage took 3 hours to clear.
2 Royal Scots Fusiliers Citation: Military Cross for Major A.F. Whitehead
Major G. H. Peile Adventures of “392 Battery”, 98th Field Regiment 1945 IWM
"The “A” Troop boating part proved something of a flop. Led by their Troop Commander in his new Sherman they made a dashing assault-landing only to find that the only opposition came from “B” Troop, since their Landing Craft Tank had landed on the south side of the river instead of the north."
17 Infantry Brigade War Diary
Copyright: Imperial War Museum
(Video IWM 643/ 5-7)
The Brigade Artillery Officer,
Captain H. W. Hill of Scotland calls out “fire” orders from his wireless truck
to the sailors crouched beside it over their wireless sets, with which they
transmit his orders to the destroyers off shore. Finally another Officer is seen pointing out
targets to a sailor holding the firing-map.
13 Infantry Brigade War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 0750
By about first light the two forward Battalions were estimated on their objectives. 2 Inniskillings had Battalion HQ and one Company on the contour. 2 Wiltshires had Companies on Point 102, Point 201 and in Tufo. Heavy casualties had been suffered by both Battalions from enemy small arms fire, mines, mortars, and artillery fire. The enemy positions had been overrun but there were sections of infantry and snipers still in the area.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Medal for Sergeant Robert Boak
17–18 Jan 44
Sgt. Boak, as Pioneer Sgt. with 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, was ordered to move with a fighting patrol ahead of the Battalion to give warning of mine fields and, if possible, to clear paths for the Battalion. Owing to the break-down of the original crossing this party reached the start line well ahead of the Battalion. Sgt Boak reconnoitred a route forward across the River Ausente a tributary of the River Garigliano, and, with the greatest personal bravery, remained in the riverbed during the opening of our barrage, which fell on the river, so as to clear forward the road, ahead of the attacking troops. It was due to the outstanding courage and devotion to duty of this NCO that the right attacking Company got through the enemy mine fields without a single casualty.
The left company suffered a number of casualties in the mine fields and Sgt. Boak at once moved to their assistance and was of the greatest help to the Company Commander in getting his Company through the mines. Sgt. Boak’s sang froid had a most tonic effect on the Company, and but for him it would undoubtably have lost time and dropped behind the barrage.
The Garigliano. Position at 8am on 18 Jan 44 showing routes taken by 2 Inniskillings, 2 Wiltshires and 2 Cameronians. (Map John Strafford)
T. B. Davis The Surrey & Sussex Yeomanry (98 Field Regiment) 1980
18 Jan 44
“Monte Argento was supported by a fire- plan from the Regiment. Not until midday was the little hill finally taken. The Royal Scots Fusiliers had suffered nearly two hundred casualties in a total advance of two miles and the Seaforth Highlanders had lost two hundred and forty. To the right of 17 Brigade the picture was less gloomy, for 13 Brigade had gained all its objectives, and Major Peile and Capt. Stride were across the river with 6 Northants. The Minturno Ridge was still in enemy hands but the Royal Pioneer Corps were maintaining a constant smokescreen along the line of the river and under cover of this were swiftly constructing a tank ferry.”
164 Field Ambulance War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1700
Major Ross seriously wounded near ferry by a mortar bomb.
2 Wiltshires War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1800
‘C’ Company ordered back to Point 102.
D. Woolard, attached to 2 Wiltshires, My Day,
18 January
‘We moved up into Tufo and then we were sent out into Companies, two detachments to each Company if they needed any mortar support. Jobber Brown’s detachment and ours, Gibb Mullins were sent to “D” Company at the top of Hill 102. After breakfast we drew rations on our way up to the new positions and as soon as we got there, we started to dig our two gun-pits and set the mortars in. We prepared the bombs ready to range when ordered. Our Observation Post was in a house close to the gun-pits, it had been hit many times by shells and had to be entered through a shell-hole on the opposite side to the enemy positions. When inside you went up to an attic which had a small window from which you could see quite an area of enemy held territory. As this house was under constant observation by the enemy, it was dangerous to use binoculars during daylight if it was sunny, or to move about too much.
Apart from a few enemy shells and mortar bombs at intervals, the Germans intensified shelling towards sunset. Our detachment dug deep slit trenches behind two straw stacks so that any shrapnel from exploding shells would be slowed down or stopped from falling into our trenches. The other detachment dug their slit trenches in a bank and covered them with old doors, wood, and branches. In the afternoon we did some ranging with smoke bombs but were not called on to do any real task. Again, we gathered some straw to put in our slit trenches to keep us a little warmer at night. We slept in full equipment ready to stand to the mortars during the night if ordered to do so. We even kept our steel helmets on as several shells fell quite close that night and shrapnel fell extremely near to our slit trenches. When it was my turn to go on guard, I could see the flash and glow of exploding shells and mortar bombs.’
Sir David Cole, 2 Inniskillings, Rough Road To Rome.
18 Jan 44
‘The evening of 18 January was cold and grey, with a sparse wintry mist hanging low above the ground and a few stars twinkling feebly in a darkening sky. “B” Company were savagely attacked from three sides. First they knew of it was when in the gathering darkness they heard the Germans, obviously in large numbers, shouting and cat calling from amongst the scrub and trees below. The Germans, visible only from time to time as black shapes flitting between the trees, were not only swarming up the ridge in front; they were streaming across the exposed left flank where the ridge ran along to Tufo and soon afterwards they were also heard shouting and trampling about on the slope behind “B” Company.
To begin with, our men not only held on, but in many places climbed out of their trenches and counter charged the Germans with Brens and Tommy-guns. For example, Sergeant Anderson, having seized a German Spandau, charged the enemy with it, and killed many of them at close quarters. As he said laconically afterwards: “I had the Spandau and I had the ammunition, and the Germans were there.” But our losses were also heavy and soon Section Commanders could be heard shouting one after another, that their ammunition was running low. About the same time another Spandau opened fire from the Company’s right flank, a menacing portent that the Germans would soon complete their encirclement. Eventually it became clear that the much-reduced Company was being further and seriously depleted, was all but surrounded by a much larger force and had almost exhausted its ammunition. It was decided, therefore that rather than be completely overrun they would try to withdraw the remnants of the Company to continue the fight elsewhere. Orders were given for a general withdrawal towards “C” Company. They withdrew across the rear side of the ridge through the narrow gap still unblocked by the Germans. When “B” Company finally assembled the battered survivors of the Company totalled about 35. Within twenty-four hours over sixty men had been lost and the Company had been reduced to little more than a Platoon.
With the Germans thus re-established just along the ridge, “C” Company was now obviously on the chopping-block next. The Company was then re-organised using the remnants of “B” Company to guard the now highly vulnerable left flank. Vickers machine gunners from 7 Cheshires were placed astride the track leading to the area just recaptured by the Germans.
Royal Inniskillings Regimental Museum
‘B’ Company found itself under attack from three sides by overwhelming numbers. As ammunition began to run out and hand to hand fighting developed, the decision was taken to withdraw. Only the bravery of men like Sergeant Thomas Vincent Anderson, Corporal Stephen Hughes, and Fusilier John Stranex enabled the Company to withdraw to ‘C’ Company’s position.
Expecting further counterattacks, Major Percy Blake [‘C’ Company], organised his Company and the remnants of ‘B’ Company. When the attack came, elements of practically the whole Battalion fought a ferocious battle to keep the Germans at bay. Eventually sustained British artillery fire halted the attack.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Medal for Sergeant Thomas Vincent Anderson 18 Jan 44
‘B’ Company, 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers was in position on its objective 809964 [East end of Minturno-Tufo ridge]. The Company Sergeant Major had been wounded and Sgt. Anderson was acting as CSM. The Germans counter attacked the Company and a party got into the position. Sgt. Anderson, who had armed himself with a German machine gun, rushed the German party firing his machine gun from the hip. He killed several of the Germans and the remainder were thrown into confusion and dealt with. The ammunition situation in the Company became acute towards evening and ‘B’ Company was forced by another attack to fall back on ‘C’ Company’s position about 814964 [500m downhill, East of the end of the ridge]. Sgt. Anderson remained behind covering the withdrawal with his German machine gun, and it was due to his outstanding personal bravery and coolness that the majority of ‘B’ Company was withdrawn in good order. In re-organising ‘B’ Company in its new position Sgt. Anderson’s behaviour in moving about under close range enemy fire put fresh heart into his Company after a difficult time and brought their morale back to the highest level.
There is little doubt that but for the initiative and cool calculating bravery of this NCO a great part of his Company would have been killed or captured.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Medal for Corporal Stephen Hughes
18 Jan 44
Corporal Hughes was in command of a Section attached to ‘B’ Company, 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, in position on the Minturno-Tufo ridge when a heavy German counterattack developed against ‘B’ Company, its main thrust being against the Platoon with which Cpl. Hughes Section was part of. With great determination Cpl. Hughes held the fire of his Section until the enemy were only 25yards away. The effect of this was to kill a number of Germans and to defeat that attack.
When the remainder of his Platoon ran out of ammunition Cpl. Hughes continued to hold the enemy off until he was the only one left with ammunition. The enemy had by now infiltrated round both flanks of his Section. Cpl. Hughes with great personal courage moved forward alone and attacked the enemy on the right flank allowing his Section to withdraw. Cpl. Hughes himself, worked through the enemy and by engaging them with his Thomson sub machine gun from their rear, held up their attack and caused them confusion.
His personal bravery throughout the action was a fine example to all in his vicinity.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Medal for Fusilier John Stranex
18 Jan 44
Fusilier Stranex was Platoon runner of 10 Platoon, ‘B’ Company, 2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers which was in position about 809964 [East end of Minturno-Tufo ridge].
The Germans delivered a number of determined counterattacks in one of which they over ran a Section Post. The Platoon Commander was with another Section and Fusilier Stranex at once led the other two Fusiliers in the Platoon HQ forward, drove the enemy back from the Post, they had captured with the bayonet and successfully held it.
But for the personal bravery and quick wits of Fusilier Stranex there is no doubt the Germans would have succeeded in taking the remainder of the Platoon from the rear.
17 Infantry Brigade HQ War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 1900
First Carrier (2 Royal Scots Fusiliers) to leave beach blown up on mine 20 yards along track. No casualties, but all ammunition destroyed.
18 Jan 44 – 2010
5 Seaforths report Company in Amphitheatre out of touch. Uneasy situation.
2 Royal Scots Fusiliers War Diary
18 Jan 44
Seven Carriers eventually got across river by ferry but two of these were destroyed by mines. Weather mainly very good with warm sunshine and good visibility, apart from early morning mist caused mainly by smoke screen on river.
2 Cameronians War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 2100
The first transport across the river arrived at Battalion HQ consisting of two carriers.
1 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry War Diary
18 Jan 44 – 2230
The Battalion crossed the river entirely on a marching basis. Everything had to be carried as so far, no vehicles had crossed the river. The Battalion crossed the river, 22 Officers and 450 other ranks in strength.
The march from the river Northwards to the Assembly area behind 13 Infantry Brigade was difficult and unpleasant, mines were a very real danger and a single line track had been marked across country with tapes by the Royal Engineers. This may well have been good enough for single men in daylight – but for heavily laden men in the dark – it was a nightmare despite the new moon. It was like marching across a mined Romney Marsh, deep dykes and ditches every few hundred yards. If the front halted as it often did, the whole long single file column across the plain halted as well. What a target it was if the enemy had availed themselves of it. Luckily, they did not.
X (BR) Corps History Enemy Counterattacks
On 18 Jan 44 the Germans, who from information given by some of the prisoners taken in the assault, had evidently been taken by surprise and had no strong force for a counterattack. They were nevertheless able to mount two immediate counterattacks from the resources of 94 Infantry Division, supported by tanks, and by attacking the exposed left flank of the bridgehead were able to regain some lost ground.
The counterattacks of 18 Jan 44 were the first of a long series. Although the enemy was caught with no reserves immediately available, he contrived to resist stubbornly and put in repeated local counterattacks. Forced at first to rely on its own resources 94 Infantry Division fought a costly delaying action, in which sappers and rear echelon troops were used as infantry. In the following four days while X (BR) Corps brought its reserve brigades across the River Garigliano and strove to enlarge the bridgehead, the enemy hurried from every part of the front to build up for a counter offensive.
The X (BR) Corps Commander’s intentions at the end of 18 Jan 44 were for 5 Infantry Division to launch 15 Infantry Brigade through 13 Infantry Brigade’s positions to clear the rest of the Minturno ridge.
The enemy flung into a hasty counterattack on the night 18/19 Jan 44 was mauled by our defensive fire. Heavy though his losses were, the enemy achieved his object of holding our advances in check while he massed large reserves for a counter-offensive.
The situation on the front of 5 Infantry Division improved during the night 18/19 Jan 44 when 17 Infantry Brigade succeeded in taking Monte d’Argento. Build up and maintenance continued to be a problem, however, as the river had not been bridged and the Class 5 ferry had been sunk during the afternoon of the 18 Jan 44 by a direct hit.
7 Cheshires Citation: Military Cross for Lieutenant P.C. Harris
Lieut. Harris was in command of a machine gun Platoon and landed on the beach at Monte d’Argento at about 2145, 17 Jan 44. Shortly after landing, his Company Commander was wounded, and Lieut. Harris took over the Company. Under heavy enemy fire he took his Sections up to within 150 yards of the enemy, along a completely exposed beach, and neutralised the enemy machine gun posts at short range. At first light on 18 Jan 44 Lieut. Harris moved his Platoons to fresh positions so as to avoid heavy casualties during the daylight. On the evening of 18 Jan 44 he again moved his Platoons up to within close range of the enemy in order to support an attack. Throughout the whole period the beach was under heavy enemy fire. Throughout this operation Lieut. Harris showed outstanding qualities of courage and leadership.
5 Infantry Division History
In the late afternoon 2 Cameronians made an unsuccessful bid to take over Point 201 but received very heavy mortaring which spread along the whole front and heralded a further and probably more organised counterattack. This series of counterattacks lasted for almost an hour and a half, from 1800 to 1930, and was finally beaten off when the enemy had nearly overrun Observation Posts and forward positions. Most credit must go, as it had already done, and will continue to, to the solid steel wall of defensive Artillery fire that was invariably put round our positions when they were being counterattacked. No infantryman in the Division need feel ashamed or would be unprepared to acknowledge that the gunners probably held the small River Garigliano bridgehead when called to do so at frequent intervals. So frequent were these demands for this that the Divisional Artillery fired practically unceasingly for many days.
An enemy wireless message was intercepted at that time from 274 Infantry Regiment of 94 Infantry Division who reported to their Division: ‘Enemy in Tufo and we are being shelled intensively. Request objective counterattack.’ This message was timed for 1700 and throws increasing light on the highly centralised control exercised by the Germans.
Again, our Gunner communication was used by Brigadier Campbell to instruct 2 Wiltshires to hold on at all costs and if pushed off the ridge to get back on again. 2 Wiltshires spent most of the afternoon of 18 Jan 44 in hand-to-hand fighting in the village of Tufo. Two reserve companies of 2 Cameronians went through them to try and hold Point 201 but were driven back by heavy and accurate mortar fire.
2 Royal Inniskillings Fusiliers Citation: Military Cross for Major Percy Joseph Blake
17–18 Jan 44
2 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers made an assault crossing of the River Garigliano and attacked the high ground in 8196 [East end of Minturno-Tufo ridge].
Major Blake was in command of ‘C’ Company, the right attacking Company. Owing to enemy fire, boats on the Inniskilling crossing were destroyed and ‘C’ Company were put over lower down the river. It was 0430 before Major Blake was in a position to leave the riverbank with two Platoons for the start line 3000 yards away, arriving at 0530. The drive and leadership of this officer in the subsequent advance and attack were beyond praise. His Company took their objective and were almost at once counterattacked. Major Blake’s coolness and courage were again outstanding, and he personally led his small reserve in hand-to-hand action and destroyed German parties who had got a foothold in his area. When ‘B’ Company, owing to lack of small arms ammunition were forced to fall back on ‘C’ Company’s position, Major Blake organised the active defence of his position so well that further attacks pressed home against it failed, and when he was wounded in repulsing the final attack early on 19 Jan 44 the position was secure.
During 18 Jan 44 and the night 18-19 Jan 44 the Inniskillings were the most advanced British troops and but for Major Blake’s great personal bravery and soldierly qualities in holding on, the position of much more than the Inniskillings would have been endangered.
German views of 18 Jan 44
18 Jan 44
Private Wilhelm Prinz, 274 Grenadier Regiment
‘On the night of 18 Jan 44, the artillery bombardment began again, so we had to go into our bunker, on the steep slope behind our house, as it was unreachable by enemy grenades, in a blind spot to the enemy.
Lt. Wolfgang Gieseler, III Battalion, 274 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘The long-awaited major attack of the enemy with its far superior forces is now here. Incoming reports state that our resistance groups, which are spread far apart and are also cowering in bunkers bravely hold out and survive the strong fire to some extent. When the dawn comes the artillery-fire swells up again to a hurricane to creep in weakened form into the hinterland. We now know that the enemy is about to attack for the machine guns have taken over in the meantime. In front of us on the heights near Minturno [Point 201], a bitter close combat fight is already raging, where the Command Post of the III Battalion lies. This time it is still decided in favour of the defenders; but the brave Battalion Commander falls among many others.
Major Haarbrucker, who would have already relinquished his Battalion and was about to return to Germany takes over the orphaned III Battalion, where he falls into English captivity the very next morning, badly wounded, in fierce close combat at the heights of Minturno. The remnants of the Battalion must vacate their positions and retreat to the height of our Regiment Command Post. The enemy has succeeded in a deep penetration.
Even the field replacement Battalion that was brought in for relief on the second night can no longer change the situation. The losses to officers and men are extremely high.’
Private Wilhelm Prinz, 274 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘In great haste we had brought the mail bags into the house, when a small Peugeot truck drove up. The very excited driver called on us to help unload and explained that he had loaded dead comrades who had fallen at Garigliano in the morning and were to be buried in our Regimental Cemetery, which had just been set up, just outside Minturno. That was quite a shock for me, after the quiet weeks in the military hospital, but it got even worse: full of consternation I recognized the first dead body I lifted with Karl Weiser was our doctor, Dr. Fries. The artillery fire that had just started again left no time for pity and so we quickly ended our macabre work. The trucks had to be taken out of the danger zone.’
Lt. Wolfgang Wiedemann, II Battalion, 267 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘In Formia. We listened to the strong, undulating shell fire. It had started very early. Officially there was little information. In the afternoon there was a lot of fighting and heavy losses. Captain Krege, Commanding Officer of III Battalion, 274 Grenadier Regiment was killed in close combat at Minturno. Large parts of 274 Grenadier Regiment were already destroyed.
The German leadership recognized how the main points of attack were now: Minturno and Castelforte. Now it was a matter of using the last ounce of strength to prevent a breakthrough that would have meant the end of the Cassino Front.’
Katriel Ben Arie, The Battle of Monte Cassino 1944
18 Jan 44
‘Field Marshal Kesselring immediately recognized the danger and once again proved his ability to fight land wars, especially in defence. He immediately gave the order to throw II Battalion 267 Grenadier Regiment from the coast (II Battalion secured the coastal section from Gaeta to Scauri) to the front line and to deploy all personnel including drivers of 94 Infantry Division.
However, these measures were not sufficient. The Commanding General of XIV Panzer Corps. General Fridolin Von Senger und Etterlin, contacted Kesselring directly and urgently requested the deployment of Reserves from Army Group C, namely 29 and 90 Panzer Grenadier Divisions. General Vietinghoff supported his request, since neither the Corps nor the Army had any further reserves’.
Mathew Parker, Monte Cassino
‘Von Senger was the man Field Marshall Albert Kesselring charged with the task of preventing the Allies getting past Cassino. An enigmatic figure far removed from the popular conception of a Nazi General, he had been a Rhodes Scholar to St. John’s College, Oxford, in 1912 and remained an Anglophile thereafter. Intellectual, sophisticated, and anti-Nazi, he was also a devout Roman Catholic and as a young man had become a lay Benedictine and visited many Benedictine monasteries in Germany.’
Lt. Wolfgang Wiedemann, II Battalion, 267 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘In Formia. Lieutenant Gieseler told me, as Lieutenant Colonel Reich had done all day long, how he had cheered up his company in Minturno and Tufo with a rifle in his hand and personally led several counterattacks with only a few remaining men. His example and his bravery ensured that the fighting spirit of the surviving Grenadiers remained who was part of the crew of their shelter. Only a few hours ago, a shell killed him when the shelter was destroyed as he repaired a shot-up telephone line."
Private Wilhelm Prinz, 274 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘Lieutenant Gieseler and I immediately made friends. We were on the same wavelength. Gieseler was by profession a forester in East Prussia. Lieutenant Colonel Reich was also from East Prussia. We only had a few minutes to exchange some personal points of view. His hand was bandaged. Only a few hours ago, when he and his Commander cheered up the Companies, he was injured by shrapnel. It was a slight wound, and admission to a military hospital was out of the question. Gieseler did not let down his Regiment and especially his Commander. I respected this brave and decent officer. One could feel his honest patriotism burning in his heart. Gieseler became a civilian after the Polish campaign in 1939. It was not until the end of 1942 that he became a soldier again.
Lt. Wolfgang Wiedemann, II Battalion, 267 Grenadier Regiment
18 Jan 44
‘In Formia. Finally, I received the order from the Regiment Commander to deploy 2 Company. About 2 km South-East we had to close a big gap in the front Northwest of Tufo. We had to link up the left and the right. We knew nothing about our left flank. The right flank was supposed to be at the Cemetery at the back of Minturno, on the Santa Maria Infante-Minturno road but it could be occupied by “Tommy”. Lieutenant Colonel Reich had the iron will to hold the positions of his Regiment at all costs. This pale, sleepless man bid me farewell with the usual “soldier’s luck”. He winked at me with an encouraging wink. A short handshake ended the receipt of orders. And already I stood in front of the dugout and listened where the next grenades would land. It was the second day of the great battle. The outlook was bad for me. Black night, completely unknown, quite mountainous terrain. Nobody really knew where the enemy were. There was enormous artillery fire from the sea and from the land front. I thought of my Company, which was waiting for me in trenches and tunnels somewhere nearby. Now I had to know what to do next.
Characteristic for this 2nd day of action was the seemingly endless artillery fire, the general disorientation, the nature of the wounded and the chaotic conditions during the transport of the wounded. Food and ammunition carriers went for miles through heavy artillery fire. Often, these poor people were left dead or wounded with their loads on the steep mountain slopes."
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