The Gustav Line

                                  The Gustav Line 

                                                    The Winter Line 

The Winter Line was a series of German and Italian military fortifications constructed during the Second World War commanded by Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. The series of three lines was designed to defend the Western section of Italy, focused around the town of Monte Cassino, through which ran the important Highway 6 which led uninterrupted to Rome. The primary Gustav Line ran across Italy from just North of where the River Garigliano flows into the Tyrrhenian Sea in the West, through the Apennine Mountains to the mouth of the River Sangro on the Adriatic coast in the East.

                                                         The Gustav Line 

The plan was for the French Expeditionary Corps to attack on the right in the mountain sector to the North of Cassino on 12 Jan 44, X (BR) Corps to force a bridgehead over the River Garigliano in the coastal sector on 17 Jan 44 and for II (US) Corps to attack in the Liri valley just below Cassino on 20 Jan 44. The attacks were designed to draw German reserves away from the Rome area so that on 22 Jan 44, VI (US) Corps including a British Division could land at Anzio and threaten the rear of the Gustav Line. It was hoped that this threat would force the Germans to withdraw their troops from the Gustav Line and back to a new defence line North of Rome. 1 York & Lancs. were on the extreme left of the British Corps front by the sea near Minturno.

 Map of Southern Italy 1944 – The Gustav Line. (United States Military Academy)

X (BR) Corps History 

 By the end of the second week of January 1944, the US Fifth Army had reached the main defences of the German Winter Line. The process of closing up to the Winter Line had begun on the coast at the beginning of November and had been completed so far as X (BR) Corps was concerned and brought almost to a conclusion during the latter part of December and early January with the capture of two of three hills blocking the entrance to the Liri valley. US Fifth Army’s next task was to complete the assault on the main defences of the Winter Line.

    Rivers and mountain masses made the Winter Line, on which the Germans elected to stand for the Winter, one of the most favourable to defend and most unfavourable to attack in all Italy. In this sector it was anchored in the North to the mountain massif Monte Cairo, and it continued across the Liri Valley behind the River Gari to the foothills of the Aurunci range on the West bank of the River Garigliano with the Southern flank resting on the sea. The US Fifth Army had first to cross the river obstacle presented by the Rapido-Gari-Garigliano in the face of an enemy established in commanding positions in the mountains and then to launch a frontal assault against the mountain positions, which the enemy had over two months to prepare their defence.

    The US Fifth Army plan for X (BR) Corps was that on 17 January they would attack and force the crossing of the River Garigliano in the Minturno area so as to secure the Lateral road East of the Aurunci foothills and proceeding along it to enter the Liri Valley behind the River Gari and having established a bridgehead employ the maximum amount of armour to exploit West and Northwest.

    The sector chosen for X (BR) Corps main attack was a nine mile stretch of the River Garigliano [from Castelforte to the Tyrrhenian sea]. It was defended at the beginning of January by a new and comparatively inexperienced German horse-drawn Infantry Division [the 94 Infantry Division]. Although only a proportion of the enemy reserves were likely to appear in any one sector, it was likely that the two to one superiority, which X (BR) Corps enjoyed initially, would disappear as the battle progressed [and German reserves were rushed down from Rome]. 

    94 Infantry Division consisted of :

    • ‘94’ Fusilier Battalion 

    • ‘267’ Grenadier Regiment

    • ‘274’ Grenadier Regiment 

    • '276' Grenadier Regiment 

    • '194' Infantry Regiment

The flat alluvial plain of the lower River Garigliano begins where the river emerges from a short gorge between the Monte Camino massif and the Northern shoulder of the Aurunci foothills and follows a winding course to the [Tyrrhenian] sea. As the river approaches the sea the plain broadens rapidly and reaches a width of about ten miles at the coast. In winter, the low ground on both banks of the river is intersected by numerous water courses, streams, and ditches, which form an effective obstacle to mechanised movement. Only a few un-metalled tracks lead down to the East [river] bank, many of them impossible in bad weather, whilst the two railway lines, which also cross the river, were so demolished as to be unusable. The river itself was nowhere fordable, its banks were three to four hundred feet apart and normally about fifteen feet high and the stream itself was wide, deep, and fast flowing at that season. Sites for bridging or for rafting vehicles were thus limited to the Minturno bridge and to the few good tracks. These were well known to the enemy and the exits on the West bank had been extensively mined.

    The hills which the enemy held centred on the villages of Minturno and Castelforte. The Southern group of hills, centring round Minturno-Tufo, was not formidable, rising nowhere above six hundred feet.

 The River Garigliano plain looking east – the sea on the right. (Photo, John Strafford)

X (BR) Corps Plan

 Since the flat land between the river [Garigliano] and the (German) enemy-held hills was nowhere more than two miles wide, the enemy enjoyed excellent close observation of the river line. It was therefore important initially to secure a bridgehead on the commanding ground of the Minturno-Tufo hills to deny the enemy this observation at an early stage so that supporting weapons and vehicles could be rafted across the river by surprise at the outset, there appeared to be a good prospect of achieving this objective. X (BR) Corps Plan was to launch [two Infantry Divisions across the Garigliano at the same time, 5 Infantry Division on the left focused on the Minturno-Tufo feature and 56 Infantry Division on the right on the Damiano-Castelforte feature]. 5 Infantry Division to secure a firm bridgehead round Minturno, then to swing Northwards up the Ausente valley towards Ausonia (15 kilometres distant from the River Garigliano) and capture the rear of the River Liri valley defences.

     Although engineer operations and the movement of vehicles would be hampered by enemy minefields and by the poor approaches and exits to the river it was hoped by the comparatively lavish use of rafts to ensure that the infantry would be well supported by getting their support weapons and more ammunition across early in the assault.

 X (BR) Corps Attack across the River Garigliano. 17 Jan 44, (The Battles for Monte Cassino, J. Plowman, P. Rowe. (After the Battle 2011). Battle of Britain International Ltd.)

Frank de Planta, battlefield expert, 46 Infantry Division 

‘X (BR) Corps had a third Infantry Division which was 46 Infantry Division. It did not take part in the X (BR) Corps assault because it had been withdrawn by HQ US Fifth Army on 19 Jan 44. In support of the planned II (US) Corps assault in the Liri valley on 20 Jan 44 46 Infantry Division was to cross the River Garigliano and seize the hill feature and village of Sant Ambrogio. This was intended to ensure that II (US) Corp’s left flank was not exposed to German observation during the assault in the Liri Valley. The impact of taking 46 Infantry Division away from X (BR) Corps was that X (BR) Corps Command had no reserve formation to use in exploitation if a gap in the German line was made.

    The plan to help II US Corps did not go at all well. 46 Infantry Division attack was launched by 128 Hampshire Brigade but their attempts to cross the River Garigliano near Sant Ambrogio were unsuccessful. They were due to cross on the night 19-20 Jan 44 but the Germans on that day, opened the sluices of a dam higher upstream on the River Liri, so that the River Garigliano was higher and flowing faster than predicted."

Richard Doherty, Monte Cassino: Opening the Road to Rome

‘The speed of the current swept away assault boats on the first attempt. At the next attempt, using a cable, the line broke after only five men had crossed. A third attempt saw about thirty men of 2 Hampshires cross at the mouth of the Peccia stream but the swift  current made it impossible for the boats to return and the isolated Platoon was overrun. Dense fog hindered operations, forcing the assaulting Battalions to return to their former positions. The failure of the Hampshire Brigade meant that the left flank of II US Corps would be exposed as it made its subsequent efforts to cross the Gari to the North.’

    The consequence of this were very serious, particularly for the US forces. 36 Division of II US Corps failed to cross the River Gari [the upper reaches of the River Garigliano] suffering 1681 casualties: 143 dead, 663 wounded and 875 missing. After the War ended there was a US Congressional enquiry into this attack.

    In 5 Infantry Division it was apparent that even if their operation went well, there would inevitably be some delay before (Bailey) bridges capable of carrying the all important armour could be built across the River Garigliano. Moreover, the only suitable site for a Class 30 bridge was the demolished bridge crossing on Route 7 and this would certainly be registered by the enemy artillery. To prevent a delay arising in consequence of this, X (BR) Corps engineers planned to establish fourteen rafts to ferry guns and vehicles across as soon as the assaulting Brigades had crossed.

Preliminary Operations 

To conceal the attack 5 Infantry Division was not put into the line until two days before the attack was due to begin. Its sector, which ran from the railway bridge to the coast was held by a light screening force formed from the divisional troops of 6 Infantry Division [1 King’s Dragoon Guards from 23 Armoured Brigade]. Under cover of this screen 5 Infantry Division carried out its reconnaissance of the river line and finally took over the sector on the night of 15–16 Jan 44. Engineer reconnaissance was carried out intensively during the period and parties of Sappers working without infantry escort were able to patrol the river line and determine the best crossing places. Much equipment assault boats rafts, and bridging material were needed for the crossing and careful measures to conceal any recognisable equipment carrying vehicle were done so that surprise would not be lost. The task of moving X (BR) Corps Artillery and building up the large dumps of ammunition required for the attack had to be carried out at night, since the gun positions, although partially protected from view by olive groves were generally on forward slopes under observation from the hills across the River Garigliano; moreover, they were served by a single road, along which all guns, ammunition and normal maintenance traffic had to pass. Over and above the normal artillery of the assaulting Divisions more than nine Regiments were assembled to support the attack; nevertheless, their movement appears to have escaped the notice of the enemy and the weight of the opening barrage took him by surprise. The enemy was cleared from the whole of the East bank of the river though a few outposts remained on the West bank of the river itself and at the railway bridge. Those were left to be dealt with by the assaulting Brigades so that the  enemy should not be forewarned of the impending attack.

    In the initial plan of 5 Infantry Division the successive objectives were:

a) To capture the area San Vito – Monte Natale. 

b) To advance astride the road Minturno – Ausonia with the object of capturing the defile [and debouching into the Liri valley]

The assault was to be made at night. 5 Infantry Division, on the left with a long approach march to the river line, was to make a silent crossing. The principal change in the order of battle for the attack was the transfer of 201 Guards Brigade to 5 Infantry Division in order to provide the necessary reserve for that Division to exploit Northwards out of the bridgehead in the second phase.  The [fighting element of the] order of battle was:

5 Infantry Division 

 13 Infantry Brigade 

 15 Infantry Brigade 

 17 Infantry Brigade 

 201 Guards Brigade 

 40 Royal Tank Regiment [less two squadrons] 

 Belgian Troop, 10 Commando 

Divisional artillery plus one Field [self-propelled] and one Medium Regiment. The gun areas, on the forward slopes leading down to the river were dispersed in the thickly wooded and broken country around Leure.

 Air and Naval Support
Air and naval support played a disappointing part in the battle. It had been hoped that naval and air bombardment would have practically isolated the battle area during the first days of the assault but some of these resources were required elsewhere and very bad weather interfered with both sea and air operations, however, with the result that after the enemy had recovered from the initial surprise, he was able to move reserves into the battle area practically unimpeded.

HMS Orion Naval History 

15 Jan 44

HMS Orion, a Leander-class light cruiser of the Royal Navy, participated in the bombardment of Gaeta, Italy. This operation was part of a coordinated effort involving other naval vessels, including HM Cruiser Spartan and several destroyers such as Faulknor, Jervis, Janus, and Laforey. HMS Orion had a distinguished service history, earning numerous battle honours throughout the war.

              HMS Orion, a similar ship to the cruiser HMS Spartan. (naval history.net web site)

 Frank de Planta, battlefield expert 

‘For their attack X (BR) Corps decided to use 14 rafts in the early crossings, including two strong enough for tanks. Sappers would not try to install any bridges until the German artillery Observation Posts had been cleared of the bridge sites. They had to use the existing road approaches to the river because winter flooding had made the fields on both sides too soft to carry a large number of military vehicles in wet weather, and these roads were certainly registered by German guns. All the early parts of the operation went well using the one good road.

    On 16–17 Jan 44 Allied aircraft bombed ‘94’ Infantry Division positions and they were supported by two cruisers and five destroyers firing from offshore. 17 Infantry Brigade were accompanied by a Naval Gunfire Control Officer who was able to direct the fire of one of the cruisers. The Brigade were to have tanks from 40 Royal Tank Regiment in support [about 60 Sherman tanks].

    7 Cheshires had a support role in the attack. ‘A’ Company was allocated to 17 Infantry Brigade, ‘B’ Company to 13 Infantry Brigade, ‘C’ Company to 201 Guards Brigade and ‘D’ Company to 15 Infantry Brigade in Division reserve. 7 Cheshires was organised with a Battalion HQ, an MMG Company of three Platoons, an Anti-Aircraft Company of four Platoons and a Mortar Company of two Platoons. MMG Company had 12 Vickers MMGs – four per Platoon which moved in carriers. Anti-Aircraft Company had 16 20mm Oerlikon quick-firing guns each pulled by a 15cwt truck. Mortar Company eight 4.2-inch barrels – four per Platoon and each carried in a 15cwt truck.

 X (BR) Corps attacks across the River Garigliano, 17 Jan 44. (The Battle for Monte Cassino, J. Plowman. P. Rowe. (After the Battle 2011). Battle of Britain International Ltd.)